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Introduction 
Dina Siegel (Utrecht University/CIROC)
In this issue of the CIROC Newsletter, the reader will find a number 
of articles based on on-going and/or completed research on organised 
crime conducted by criminologists in the Netherlands. Four different 
subjects are discussed here: firstly, the involvement of organised crime 
in cross-border marriages in Europe by Julia Rushchenko, Ukrainian 
PhD candidate of the Erasmus Mundus Programme of four universities 
(Kent, Elte Budapest, Hamburg and Utrecht). The second research 
project presented here was carried out by Henk van de Bunt and his 
research team from the Erasmus University Rotterdam on the Extra 
Secure Institution (EBI) in the Netherlands, which houses infamous 
organised crime figures and other prisoners who pose an extreme flight 
risk. The third article, written by Dutch PhD candidate Joep Rottier 
(Utrecht University), takes us to New Zealand, eleven years after pros-
titution was decriminalised in this country. The fourth article brings us 
back to the Netherlands. Richard Staring from the Erasmus University 
Rotterdam discusses the recent research he and his research team con-
ducted on the risk of radicalisation among Turkish-Dutch young adults 
and the potential danger to Dutch society inherent in such a process. 
 In the section Book Reviews, Edwin Kruisbergen, a criminologist at 
the Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice, reviews a recently published 
book by Professor Emeritus Cyrille Fijnaut, one of the country’s leading 
criminologists. The review focuses on Fijnaut’s overview and analysis of 
developments in research on organised crime.
As usual, the Newsletter also provides a list of new publications on 
organised crime by CIROC researchers.
Tackling organized crime or defending family rights? Different 
approaches in the UK and Germany towards policing marriage 
migration 
Julia Rushchenko, Ph.D. candidate, DCGC, Utrecht University and  
Hamburg University
In the framework of my PhD project dedicated to cross-border marriages 
in Germany, the issue of policing marriage migration carried out by the 
state caught my attention. While interviewing bi-national couples, I no-
ticed that in some cases certain measures are being taken in order to de-
termine whether a marriage is “fake” or “bona fide”. Furthermore, the EU 
states do not have a common approach in implementing these policies; in 
recent years some states have been turning towards a punitive perspective, 
whereas others maintain a more relaxed vision of the problem. 
 Policing marriage migration is deeply interwoven with the way the 
state approaches questions of citizenship and immigration policy. Until 
recently international migration theory has paid scant attention to the 
role of states in causing, controlling and shaping migrant flows (Aleinikoff 
2011: 267). Policing marriage migration is defined and determined by 
the prevalent state’s vision of migration control, or, in other words, by the 
holistic idea of who is welcome in the country and who is not. Marriage 
migration control can be executed at three levels: the preventive level 
(through the actions of the civil registrar), the repressive level (through the 
practice of annulment) and through a possible criminal conviction leading 
to a fine or a term in prison (Foblets & Vanheule 2006). 
 Besides being perceived as “gold-diggers” by relatives and social circle, 
non-EU spouses from economically weak countries are often stigmatized 
by the immigration authorities via intrusions into the personal intimate 
family space, including separate interrogations and cross-checks. The 
process of investigation of whether a marriage is “fake” or “genuine” 
sometimes involves the interrogation of neighbours, a search of personal 
belongings with the goal of finding any proof of whether the marriage is 
indeed “bona fide”, such as signs of actual cohabitation, intimate corre-
spondence, wedding pictures and other wedding attributes (rings, dresses, 
gifts) etc. A similar investigation can also be initiated based on an anony-
mous denunciation to the police that the marriage was fraudulent.
 There have been attempts by the European Union to formulate a set 
of criteria that would allow the immigration authorities to judge the au-
thenticity of a marriage. According to European Council Resolution 07/C 
382/01 of 4 December 1997 on measures to be adopted on the combating 
of marriages of convenience, the following factors may provide grounds 
for believing that a marriage is one of convenience: 1) the fact that matri-
monial cohabitation is not maintained, 2) the lack of an appropriate con-
tribution to the responsibilities arising from the marriage, 3) the spouses 
have never met before their marriage, 4) the spouses are inconsistent about 
their respective personal details, 5) the spouses do not speak a language 
understood by both, 6) a sum of money has been handed over in order for 
the marriage to be contracted (with the exception of money given in the 
form of a dowry in the case of nationals of countries where the provision 
of a dowry is common practice), 7) the past history of one or both of the 
spouses contains evidence of previous marriages of convenience or resi-
dence anomalies.
 However, although the European Council’s resolution is one of the 
core documents on dealing with “bogus” marriages, the way marriage 
migration is framed and governed differs greatly between the Member 
States. In Germany, the topic of police investigations of the private life of 
bi-national families has received wide coverage by journalists and human 
rights activists after a German-Turkish couple, following an investigation 
by the immigration authorities, brought their case to the court in Bremen. 
The Alien’s Office decided that it was a typical “sham marriage”, because it 
allegedly found some disparities and inconsistencies in the answers of the 
spouses. In search of justice, the couple’s lawyer further maintained that 
interrogations and searches of the couple’s home violated their fundamen-
tal right to privacy and “informational self-determination” (Gösner 2012).
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materials in the German language regarding “Scheinehe” made it clear 
that this issue has lately been discussed in Germany in relation to human 
rights, campaigns for the rights of undocumented migrants and the inte-
gration of immigrants (particularly the concept of “Willkommenskultur” 
– welcoming culture). The questions posed to the couples during interro-
gation (e.g. Who sleeps on the left side of the bed? Does your spouse bring 
you gifts?) as well as the whole concept of surveillance of the intimate 
sphere by the immigration authorities are sharply criticized (Dernbach 
2012; Havlicek 2010). Moreover, in the German mass media as well as in 
the materials presented by lawyers and NGOs that support immigrants, 
a “sham” marriage is often called a “Schutzehe”, which means “protection 
marriage”. This term describes a situation in which a German citizen who 
feels sympathetic towards a non-EU person without a valid residence 
permit, agrees to marry this non-EU citizen in order to save him/her from 
deportation or having an undocumented status. Criticism of the policing 
of marriage migration is not limited to mainstream mass media and hu-
man rights campaigners. The recently released documentary “Werden Sie 
Deutscher” (2013) provides a moralizing portrayal of investigations by 
the state while also narrating the story of a Bangladeshi immigrant who is 
married to a German woman. It is recognized that protection of national 
boundaries can hinder family life when a punitive approach towards mar-
riage migration is adopted.
 This perspective stands in contrast to mass media and government 
rhetoric regarding “marriages of convenience” in the UK, where investi-
gations into “sham” marriages are viewed exclusively in relation to crim-
inalization and organized crime. This could be explained by the fact that 
in recent years a large number of Eastern European, Pakistani and Indian 
gangs supplying brides and grooms to non-EU nationals in order to obtain 
indefinite residence permits, have been prosecuted by the authorities. It 
is emphasized that “sham” marriages could be carried out on three levels: 
individual, local and international, i.e. via criminal networks involved in 
multiple and highly lucrative immigration offences (Vine, 2013). Not only 
does the UK Border Agency regularly report on the apprehension of in-
ternational gangs, but it also mentions the names of individuals involved, 
provides pictures of convicts and indicates the measures of punishment. 
For instance, it is stated regarding a recent case that “a gang of 18 behind a 
sham marriage scam stretching from Yorkshire to Pakistan have been jailed 
for a total of nearly 28 years” (UK Border Agency, 2013).
 Besides regularly reporting on its success in cracking down on immi-
gration offenders via the press and in official documents replete with statis-
tics, the UK Border Agency also encourages UK residents to participate in 
crime detection by collaborating with the officials. Visitors to the Border 
Agency’s website find the following explicit message: “Anyone with infor-
mation about immigration crime can contact Crimestoppers on 0800 555 
111 anonymously or visit their website Crimestoppers”. It is clear that the 
UKBA tackles irregular migration through close cooperation with the reg-
istrars. The latter adopt a proactive role in detecting more and more suspi-
cious cases of brides and grooms allegedly taking part in “sham” marriages 
to circumvent immigration and asylum rules (Wandsworth Council). 
The following quote by Mark Harper, a UK immigration minister, exem-
plifies very well the current stance towards policing marriage migration: 
‘Immigration crime is not victimless. The gangs involved in this activity 
often have links to serious organized crime and it places huge pressure 
on the public purse at a time when the country can least afford it. […] 
The message to those involved is clear. We will catch you and we will not 
hesitate to take the strongest possible action” (UK Border Agency, 2013). 
Therefore, the emphasis is placed on detecting immigration offenders con-
nected to organized crime, and policing marriage migration is represented 
as a political issue linked to the threats of irregular migration and welfare 
fraud. Unlike the situation in Germany, the human rights perspective is 
very rarely mentioned, which goes in line with the recent rise of Euroscep-
ticism and hostility towards European human rights mechanisms such as 
the European Convention on Human Rights. 
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Imprisoned in the EBI 
Prof. Dr. Henk van de Bunt, Erasmus University Rotterdam/CIROC
 
During the eighties and nineties of the last century the nature of orga-
nized crime in the Netherlands changed. The number of drug trafficking 
offences increased considerably and the sentences for this type of orga-
nized crime became more severe. A consequence of this development was 
that the Dutch Prison Service found itself confronted with a new catego-
ry of prisoners, who were serving long prison sentences and were eager 
to escape. Following several violent breakouts in the early 1990s, the 
housing of prisoners who posed a flight risk and/or a risk to society was 
concentrated in a special prison facility. This facility, the Extra Secure 
Institution (EBI), was established in 1993, with a capacity of 26 prison 
cells. The EBI is designed to house prisoners who (1) pose an extreme 
flight risk and an unacceptable risk to society because of the danger of 
recidivism for serious violent offences, or (2) pose an unacceptable risk 
to society if they escape from detention, but the risk of flight as such is 
of secondary importance. This involves situations where the escape of 
the prisoner would lead to serious societal or political unrest. 
Since its inception in 1993, the EBI has delivered on its promise to se-
cure the specific target population entrusted to its care. Not one prisoner 
has escaped from the EBI since 1993. The main objective of the EBI 
has thus been achieved. The question is at what price this effectiveness 
is being achieved. The question is warranted given that the EBI’s strict 
security precautions have given rise to controversy and criticism from 
the outset. Against this background, the Ministry of Security and Justice 
commissioned a study to examine the functioning of the EBI and, more 
specifically, the various ‘costs’ of the institution’s regime. 
Approach and research methods
In order to answer our research questions we used various methods and 
studied a range of sources. We interviewed 40 persons in 35 interviews: 
policy makers who were instrumental in setting up the EBI, current and 
former EBI employees and current and former EBI prisoners. We also 
studied the daily and monthly reports on current and former EBI pris-
oners. In addition, we obtained key figures on, among other things, the 
number of staff employed, the costs of EBI cells, the number of pris-
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oners and the length of their stay, the number of internal sanctions and 
measures, and the number of complaint cases. To this end, we used the 
data sources made available by the EBI. To examine the legal position 
of EBI prisoners we used the customary juristic methods and sources, 
such as regulations and jurisprudence. Finally, we used several other 
research methods and sources, such as attending staff meeting; conduct-
ing informal conversations with prison staff and detainees; observing the 
work routines and interactions between prison staff and detainees; and 
studying the research literature, policy documents and parliamentary 
documents. 
Strict rules and a maximum of surveillance
The establishment of the EBI with its maximum security level went 
against the trend in modern penitentiary history described by the Dutch 
criminologist Herman Franke of encouraging self-control and personal 
responsibility among detainees, as is the case with ‘half-open’ prisons. 
The prisoners in the EBI are kept in line not by self-control, but by 
extreme external control. They are left in no doubt that any attempt at 
escape will be futile. Although a shift can be observed in the enforce-
ment of the strict and limited EBI regime, this regime remains unique 
in the Netherlands. A prisoner’s stay in the EBI is governed by a large 
number of norms, some of which apply to penitentiary institutions in 
general, while others specifically apply to the EBI. Existing legislation 
provides for far-reaching powers of the prison director and restrictions 
on the rights and freedoms of the detainees. The EBI regime is further 
defined by the way in which these powers are being put to use. 
Some elements of the regime, such as systematic searches and the ab-
sence of any possibility to talk to life partners and close relatives with-
out a glass partition, have since been adjusted. However, the regime is 
restrictive and it entails far-reaching limitations on various basic rights, 
such as the right to privacy, family life and physical integrity. The re-
strictions on contact with the outside world constitute the most difficult 
aspect of life in the EBI. 
Working in the EBI 
Characteristics of working in the EBI include the specific nature of the 
target population and a regime that is different to that of other facilities 
within the prison system. Safety and control are the key words of the 
regime and the daily activities are governed by rules and routines. The 
life of the prisoners as well as the duties of the prison staff are struc-
tured according to set patterns. All through the day there are all sorts 
of monitoring and control activities during which various challenges 
present themselves, such as staying alert while interacting with detainees. 
When the daily routine is interrupted by the recalcitrant behaviour of a 
prisoner, staff members are faced with the challenge of responding in an 
adequate manner. 
While safety and control are central to the regime, the development of 
humanization has increasingly become prevalent in the EBI. This trend 
has taken hold not only in the physical prison environment – architec-
tural choices, furnishings, carpeting, upholstery –, but also in the treat-
ment of detainees by prison staff. Humanization is often deployed as a 
means to increase security. This concept is known as ‘dynamic security’.
  Staff members are expected to treat the prisoners humanely and be 
sensitive to their personal circumstances. All the same, there is mutual 
suspicion and distrust. The prison staff expresses suspicion and distrust 
of the prisoners in a variety of ways. Conversely, they are treated with 
suspicion and distrust by the detainees. All this leads to a vicious circle in 
the communication between staff and detainees: there is no contact be-
cause there is distrust, and because there is no contact, there is distrust, 
despite all the good intentions of dynamic security and humanization. 
As far as the immaterial personal costs are concerned, the question is 
whether staff in the EBI are more often confronted with violence or 
other undesirable behaviour, which might – sooner or later – affect 
their psychological or physical well-being. This does not appear to be 
the case:  working in the EBI is not perceived as being more difficult or 
demanding than working in other prison regimes. Various other factors, 
such as the long periods of employment, the low level of sick leave, the 
expressions of job satisfaction and the relative safety in the workplace, 
indicate that there are no specific costs attached to working in the EBI. 
However, the financial operating costs of the EBI have turned out to be 
considerably higher than those of other facilities, in contrast to costs that 
are less easy to express in terms of money, such as the safety, health and 
job satisfaction of the prison staff. 
Being detained in the EBI
In 1958 Gresham Sykes published a study of the situation of prisoners 
in a maximum security prison in New Jersey. He described the different 
types of pain that prisoners feel as a consequence of their imprisonment: 
the pain of the loss of freedom and the feeling of having become a social 
outlaw (1958: 65), the lack of important necessities of life, such as sexual 
relationships and important goods and services, the loss of autonomy 
and the loss of security. 
The ‘pains of imprisonment’ described by Sykes are very recognizable 
and are used by many researchers. The EBI is an outstanding example 
of a prison that deprives detainees of a great deal of freedom and auton-
omy. The loss of security certainly applies in the EBI. However, Sykes’s 
five pains of imprisonment do not provide a sufficiently sharp picture of 
what EBI prisoners feel. It emerged from our interviews that they mainly 
suffer from the infringement of their intimacy, a cause of pain that was 
not formulated by Sykes. They suffer from the tension between the lack 
of privacy to which they are subjected (every little thing they do is regis-
tered outside the cell) and the secrecy with which the staff shroud their 
actions. As a result of the many restrictions imposed on their contacts 
with the world outside the EBI, the detainees find it difficult to main-
tain social relations with family members, spouses and friends. They live 
in an artificial, low-stimulus environment and say that this is having 
both a physical and psychological impact on them.
Other important causes of pain concern visiting arrangements, more 
specifically the restrictions that are put into force when prisoners receive 
visitors without being behind glass, and the body searches. Although 
the current use of body searches is less controversial than the practice of 
systematic body searches in the early years of the EBI, being subjected to 
a body search is still a humiliating experience for prisoners. 
The staff may distrust the prisoners, but the prisoners also distrust the 
prison staff. This distrust mainly concerns the way in which staff handle 
information. The prisoners have no idea what the staff members know 
about them and what is being done with this information. The prisoners 
are unsure about the role that their behaviour (good or bad) in detention 
plays in extension decisions. They do not know what course they should 
steer to stay out of the danger zone of an extension. This can result in 
them keeping their cards close to their chest when dealing with guards to 
prevent them from finding out about their actual circumstances. 
In addition to the distrust between detainees and personnel, there is also 
mutual distrust between prisoners. Incidents from the past have shown 
that escalations can have serious consequences. Because staff members 
only have limited opportunity to intervene, prisoners can often feel left 
to the tender mercies of their fellow-prisoners and their own devices. 
The feeling of insecurity within the EBI is also a major cause of pain for 
prisoners.
Despite these ‘costs’ of a stay in the EBI for prisoners, the EBI regime 
also has several positive side-effects. These concern the strict checks 
for contraband and the regular rhythm imposed by the regime. It is 
practically impossible for EBI detainees to obtain access to drugs and 
alcohol. Together with the strict regime that is conducive to a regular 
daily pattern, this can make a positive contribution to detainees’ general 
state of health. The management data of PI Vught show that the average 
EBI prisoner is relatively healthy in comparison to other detainees. It 
would seem that EBI prisoners make relatively little use of medical and 
psychological care. To put this into perspective, it should be noted that 
the aforementioned distrust towards care providers and the supervisory 
measures that accompany a consultation may deter detainees from using 
the services of care providers. Detainees also have more time and peace 
and quiet available to spend on a hobby or on preparing themselves for 
their hearing.
The EBI in balance? Conclusions and recommendations
In the past twenty years, the EBI has proven its right to exist compared 
to other closed facilities. There have been no hostage situations or break-
outs in the EBI, while prisoners in other institutions have made attempts 
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to escape, some of which have been successful. The question is whether 
or not it is ‘overkill’: are prisoners being subjected to certain restrictions 
unnecessarily or is too much importance being attached to security in-
terests, i.e. the prevention of breakouts, when this is being accomplished 
at the expense of other interests? When has the ceiling been reached with 
regard to taking measures to prevent breakouts? At the end of the day, the 
answer to such questions is based on normative/political considerations, 
for which this study can only contribute the building blocks. 
Gevangen in de EBI. 
Een empirisch onderzoek naar de extra beveiligde inrichting (EBI) in Vught.
Auteurs: Henk van de Bunt, Edwin Bleichrodt, Sanne Struijk, 
Pascale de Leeuw en Dieneke Struik. Boom, Den Haag 2013
Eleven years of decriminalisation of prostitution in New Zealand.
The important role of the New Zealand Prostitutes’ Collective
Joep Rottier,  PhD candidate, Utrecht University
In 2003, the New Zealand Parliament accepted the Prostitution Reform 
Act, which decriminalised prostitution. Decriminalisation meant a re-
peal of all laws against prostitution. Prostitution became recognised as 
legitimate service work and sex workers were now able to operate under 
the same legal rights as any other occupational group. The key difference 
between legalisation and decriminalisation is that with the latter there 
are no prostitution-specific regulations imposed by the state (Mossman, 
2007). Looking at the Dutch legalisation policy of voluntary prostitution 
for example, unlike New Zealand, prostitution-specific regulations are 
effective, and more are being considered by the government to improve 
control over the sex industry.
New Zealand’s decriminalisation of prostitution was a historic moment 
for the New Zealand Prostitutes’ Collective (NZPC). Without its im-
pressive efforts, the Prostitution Reform Act might not have been realised 
(Sanders, O’Neill, & Pitcher, 2011, Abel, Fitzgerald, & Healy, 2010, 
Weitzer, 2012). 
The historical background of the NZPC
The New Zealand Contagious Diseases Act of 1869 created a distinction 
between prostitutes and other poor working-class women, as well as a 
double standard of morality because of the one-way accusatory nature of 
the law: only prostitutes were required to be checked for venereal diseas-
es, while there were no rules for men (Macdonald, 1986, Jordan, 2010). 
This androcentric strategy towards sex workers continued over the course 
of the twentieth century. The injustice of this attitude was one of the 
main driving forces for the establishment in 1987 of a collective for all 
New Zealand sex workers, the NZPC. Its ultimate goal was the decrim-
inalisation of prostitution, as a result of which the image of prostitution 
could shift from ‘sex as sin’ to ‘sex as work’, i.e. a farewell to the double 
standard of morality. The structure of the NZPC needed to be open, 
meaning no registration obligation for members, and the arguments 
about the realities of sex work needed to be evidence-based, for which the 
NZPC approached academic institutions for help (Barnett, Healy, Reed, 
& Bennachie, 2010).
 
The role of the NZPC in the decriminalisation of prostitution
In keeping with the social liberal nature of the country, with its focus on 
human rights and freedom of choice, the NZPC received the support of 
governmental and non-governmental organisations, politicians, the media 
and the public. At first, however, working together with the police and 
the justice system did not always contribute to the NZPC’s objectives. Sex 
workers were reluctant to speak frankly about their issues for fear of being 
arrested or having their children removed from their care. 
An important chance to prove the importance of the NZPC’s existence 
was offered by the New Zealand Department of Health, when it asked the 
organisation to participate in the National Council on AIDS and to set 
up and run an HIV prevention program in the sex industry. The annual 
NZ $50,000 government funding could be seen as a sign that politicians 
regarded a sex worker-driven organisation as a valid holder of public funds. 
In 1988, the NZPC introduced its national ‘safe-sex’-programme.
The NZPC’s first submission for decriminalisation to the Select Commit-
tee on Justice and Law Reform in 1989 gained national media attention. 
NZPC’s frustration regarding the continuing police raids against sex 
workers also got wide public attention. On the one hand, the NZPC 
was expected to provide condoms to sex workers as part of their HIV 
prevention programme, while on the other hand, these condoms were 
being seized by the police as evidence that sex work had taken place, 
with the consequence that sex workers were being arrested for prostitu-
tion-related offences. In response to this, the NZPC threatened to refuse 
further funding from the Department of Health and successfully called 
for an interdepartmental committee to investigate reforms of the existing 
prostitution laws (Healy, Bennachie, & Reed, 2010). The awareness of a 
double standard in prostitution-related laws increased during the 1990s. 
The NZPC managed to build up a strong national profile and attract a 
broad base of support for law reform measures. 
Supporters and opponents
 The NZPC reform plans were supported by sex workers, human rights 
groups, public health experts, progressive religious/rationalist groups and 
women’s organisations. They were convinced that decriminalisation, and 
thereby abandoning the moral approach, could lead to improvement of 
sex workers’ human rights and health, to harm minimisation, to a safer 
sex industry, an easier profession exit for prostitutes (if they wanted to), 
and elimination of the double standard approach. Both conservative and 
liberal politicians were interested in elements of the intended law reform. 
In 1994, with the help of lawyers and academics, the NZPC presented a 
decriminalisation law model, parts of which were later incorporated into 
the text of the final Prostitution Reform Bill (PRB). 
Resistance came from Christian fundamentalists as well as national and 
international anti-sex feminist groups. They campaigned against the 
NZPC and against all proposals for the decriminalisation of prostitu-
tion, arguing that prostitution was an indicator of gender inequality and 
female suppression. Together with the international Coalition Against 
Trafficking in Women (CATW), they pleaded for the criminalisation of 
prostitution. Resistance also came from the sector itself. Some operators 
feared reports of mistreatment and possible prosecution for brothel 
keeping or staff influencing. Some parlour owners expressed a preference 
for regulated legislation, as opposed to decriminalisation (Barnett et al., 
2010, Healy et al., 2010, Laurie, 2010). 
The final stage towards decriminalisation
The murder of three Auckland sex workers in 1996 and the rape of three 
Christchurch sex workers intensified the debate on the necessity to im-
prove the safety of sex workers. The NZPC fought for a broader accep-
tance of the reality of sex work. It challenged arguments made by oppo-
nents by pointing to their lack of evidence-based content and by arguing 
that criminalisation would neither reduce the vulnerability of sex workers 
nor increase their safety. The decriminalisation model became feasible for 
the parliamentary process to create the PRB.
In October 2000, the PRB received its First Reading in Parliament and 
passed by 87 votes to 21. The Second Reading, in 2002, took place after 
a General Election, as a result of which parliament underwent a shift 
to the right. Both this shift and a stronger opposition were reflected in 
the vote: the PRB passed by 64 to 56. Two amendments that promoted 
criminalisation of the sector were defeated.  An amendment to introduce 
a certification system for prostitution operators was accepted. What 
was remarkable about this amendment was that it banned immigrant 
sex workers from working in the sex industry, which, according to the 
NZPC, could lead to the emergence of an illegal circuit (Barnett, 2010, 
Abel, 2010). 
Finally, on 25 June 2003, the aim of the NZPC was achieved. The PRA 
passed on a one-vote margin: 60-59, with one abstention. New Zealand 
thus became the first country in the world to decriminalise in- and 
outdoor sex work. This meant a switch from the double standard to an 
approach that focused on the improvement of the human rights as well as 
the health and safety of sex workers (Barnett et al., 2010).
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The impact of the decriminalisation policy and the continuing role of the NZPC
The most recent Prostitution Law Review in New Zealand shows that 
up until now the PRA has had a positive impact on the health and safety 
environment of sex workers. The feeling of being supported by the po-
lice and the justice system has empowered sex workers in their negotia-
tions with clients and management. The general trend towards seeing sex 
workers as ‘normal’ women instead of pitiful, coerced victims has contin-
ued. However, stigmatisation has not disappeared and neither have coer-
cion and exploitation (Weitzer, 2012, Fitzharris, 2010). The Review did 
not refer to any cases of trafficking, but the Trafficking in Persons Report 
2013 by the US Department of State found that New Zealand ‘fails in 
having a comprehensive anti-trafficking law that prohibits all forms of 
trafficking’ (Ministry of Justice, 2008, US Department of State, 2013).
In a recent interview, Catherine Healy, National Coordinator of the 
NZPC, indicated that “the US-report is very focused on the US, and 
believes it should be the law in every country, even though that law does 
not suit local conditions”. In her opinion, the US Report is biased and 
opposes decriminalisation.  
Healy furthermore stated that throughout the last decade, the NZPC 
has continued to fight off attempts to either introduce the Swedish 
model (reconsidered by a Parliamentary Select Committee in 2013-14), 
to repeal the Act, or to make amendments designed to re-criminalise 
certain parts of the sex industry, such as street-based sex work. She ex-
pressed deep concerns about the section in the PRA that criminalises 
immigrant sex workers: “Working in the sex industry makes them illegal 
and vulnerable to exploitation. In its fight against illegality, the NZPC 
strives for a modification of this rule, without much result so far”. She 
expressed optimism regarding the extent of the involvement of organised 
crime: “there is only little evidence of its involvement within the sex 
industry in New Zealand” (skype interview).
Conclusion 
The decriminalisation of prostitution in New Zealand – with an import-
ant role played by the NZPC in bringing this about – has resulted in 
improvements with regard to the human rights as well as the health and 
safety of sex workers. The NZPC is nevertheless concerned about the 
stigmatisation of sex workers, the criminalisation of immigrant sex work-
ers, and the efforts made by its opponents to partially re-criminalise sex 
work. My PhD-research focuses on the abovementioned issues as well as 
on the extent of the involvement of organised crime in the New Zealand 
sex industry. 
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Risks of radicalisation among Turkish-Dutch young adults?
Prof. Dr. Richard Staring, Erasmus University Rotterdam/ CIROC
Young adults heading for Syria to join the jihad and the safety risks 
associated with their return are currently a topic of debate in the Neth-
erlands and in many other European countries. Around 120 Dutch 
citizens have gone abroad to join the jihad and the Dutch government is 
concerned about the possible dangers these jihadists might pose to soci-
ety when they return to the Netherlands. Over the past years, the Dutch 
security services have focused on Turkish religious and political organisa-
tions (among other groups) in the context of radicalism and extremism. 
More recently, Turkish self-organisations and the media have reported on 
social problems among Turkish-Dutch citizens, varying from socio-eco-
nomic disadvantages and withdrawal into their own community to 
overrepresentation in crime statistics and increased risks of radicalisation. 
These reports have led to the present study, which focuses on questions 
regarding developments in the social position of Turkish-Dutch citizens 
in relation to possible risks of criminality and radicalisation among 
young adults of Turkish descent. 
In order to answer these questions we conducted an extensive review 
of the literature on the social position of (second generation) Turk-
ish-Dutch citizens and we examined how developments in the social 
position relate to criminality and radicalisation (and the risks thereof ). 
In addition, empirical research was carried out. We conducted interviews 
with 27 professionals used to dealing with Turkish-Dutch citizens in 
the course of their work. We also interviewed 73 Turkish-Dutch young 
adults. Our sample included young adults who sympathized with or 
were involved in movements mentioned by the Dutch security service 
(AIVD) in relation to radicalisation, but did not include any strongly 
radicalised or extremist respondents.
Developments in the socio-economic and socio-cultural positions 
A review of the literature reveals a level of ambiguity regarding the 
social position of Turkish-Dutch citizens in both socio-economic and 
socio-cultural areas. On the one hand, there have been positive develop-
ments, given that Turkish-Dutch citizens are catching up in many areas, 
especially in comparison to the indigenous population. On the other 
hand, they are (still) disadvantaged in all socio-economic areas (e.g. 
education, labour market, housing) when compared to the indigenous 
population and also, in a number of areas, in comparison to Surinam-
ese, Antillean and Moroccan citizens. This gradual process of catching 
up makes it impossible to confirm or disprove the idea of an alarming 
state of affairs or a further falling behind, as reported by the media. A 
recurring theme in the literature, which was also emphasised during our 
interviews, concerns social exclusion and discrimination, or perceptions 
thereof. Such experiences could have a negative impact on the socio-eco-
nomic position of Turkish-Dutch young people and may also pose an 
obstacle to the socio-cultural integration of Turkish-Dutch citizens.
Social relations, identification and orientation
There is a trend towards increasing ethnic heterogeneity in the social re-
lationships of Turkish-Dutch citizens, particularly among second genera-
tion and higher educated Turks, but the inward focus remains strong, as 
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evidenced by the preference for marriage partners from within their own 
community. In terms of identification and orientation, Turkish-Dutch 
citizens are generally strongly focused on their Turkish identity and on 
Turkey, certainly in comparison to Antillean, Surinamese and Moroccan 
citizens. They also have stronger transnational ties than these other mi-
grant groups, although in the case of highly educated second generation 
youngsters, identification with and orientation towards Turkey is often 
less strong. Most of the young adults we interviewed indicated that they 
felt more Turkish than Dutch, but at the same time they acknowledged 
that they had adopted many Dutch customs. A number of young adults 
identified more with Islam or the Kurdish cause than with their Turkish 
background. To a number of respondents, religion is more important 
than Turkish ethnicity when it comes to their sense of identity. Kurdish 
young adults prefer to describe themselves as ‘Kurdish-Dutch citizens’, 
rather than ‘Turkish Kurds’. Despite their strong ties to Turkey, most of 
the young adults we interviewed preferred not to live there.
Religion and political participation
A review of the literature shows that the past decade has seen a religious 
revival, especially among second generation Turkish-Dutch citizens, as 
demonstrated by, for instance, an increase in mosque attendance. Both 
the literature and our interviews indicate that Turkish-Dutch citizens 
rate the importance of religion, and more specifically Islam, very highly. 
The majority of respondents interpret Islam as being related to their 
inner life and, more specifically, to finding consolation and the meaning 
of life. Only some respondents translated their religious convictions into 
political beliefs, without however feeling the need to put their political 
ideas into practice in an activist fashion. Turkish-Dutch citizens present 
an ambiguous picture with respect to political participation. On the 
one hand, they demonstrate political involvement by a relatively high 
level of participation in political self-organisations and local politics. On 
the other hand, they have little faith in Dutch political institutions and 
show little interest in Dutch national politics or Turkish politics. Kurd-
ish-Dutch respondents are more politically active than Turkish-Dutch 
respondents: a number of them have participated in youth camps organ-
ised by the PKK and/or donated money, either directly or indirectly, to 
the PKK in Turkey. 
Risks of radicalisation: limited signs
Only tentative estimates can be made with respect to the size and extent 
of radicalisation among Turkish-Dutch citizens. First of all, it is not at all 
clear whether organisations that have caught the attention of the AIVD 
(such as the Fethullah Gülen movement or Milli Görüş) are actually rad-
ical movements. Various organisations with roots in Turkish politics and 
the Turkish diaspora, such as the religiously oriented Kaplan movement, 
the nationalist Grey Wolves and the left-wing separatist PKK, have all 
been characterised by the AIVD as radical. There are also a number of 
multi-ethnic Islamic movements with only some Turkish followers, such 
as Hizb ut Tahrir and jihadist Salafism, which is currently very much in 
the public eye. Estimates of the number of Turkish and Turkish-Dutch 
members rarely exceed more than a few dozen people, according to the 
AIVD’s annual reports. 
Considering the factors that have been linked to radicalisation, various 
predictions can be made regarding future risks of radicalisation among 
Turkish-Dutch young adults. On the one hand, an improvement in their 
socio-economic position may lead to a reduced risk of radicalisation. On 
the other hand, relative disadvantages still exist and relative deprivation 
may lead to radicalisation. From a socio-cultural viewpoint, a decreasing 
orientation towards Turkey could result in lower participation in specif-
ically Turkish radical movements, but this tells us little about possible 
participation in multi-ethnic radical movements. Simultaneously, experi-
ences of discrimination and the perception of living in (or between) two 
cultures could also increase the risk of radicalisation. 
Questions regarding the actual risks of radicalisation among Turk-
ish-Dutch young adults are difficult to answer. There are several reasons 
for this. Firstly, although a range of factors related to radicalisation can 
be identified from both the literature and the interviews, the nature 
of the correlations is unclear. Secondly, previous research has pointed 
to many factors that could have an effect on radicalisation, but no 
statements can be made regarding the relative weight of each of these 
factors or how they affect, reinforce or counteract each other. Thirdly, 
explanatory studies of criminality point to similar if not the same factors 
as explanatory studies on radicalisation.  All in all, it would seem that 
a variety of factors are at play in the emergence of radicalism and that 
developments in social position are in themselves insufficient to explain 
why young people resort to radicalism. 
Developments and factors inhibiting radicalisation
In order to answer the question as to why Turkish-Dutch young adults 
rarely end up as extreme radicals, we distinguished several factors con-
cerning (1) religious and political movements, (2) the close-knit nature 
of Turkish communities, (3) the internal emphasis on upward social 
mobility, (4) democratic convictions and (5) a tendency towards con-
formism.  Whereas ideology and religion are often seen as important 
motivating factors for radicalisation, it could also be argued that the 
specific interpretations of ideology and religion in the Turkish com-
munities act as a deterrent against radicalisation. The development of 
a secular Islam in modern Turkey in the twentieth century as well as 
the institutionalisation of Islam through mosque organisations such as 
the Diyanet, enable Turkish-Dutch young adults to be ‘good Muslims’ 
without the need for radicalisation. Turkish-Dutch young adults appear 
to take an increasingly pragmatic and individualistic approach to their 
faith, and secular Islam enables them to do so. Political organisations 
play a comparable role to religious organisations. Not only enables the 
Dutch political system immigrants and their descendants to participate 
fully in politics, but they can also realise their political ideals within the 
context of self-organisations.
It might very well be the case that the close-knit nature of the Turkish 
communities and a strong inward-looking focus offers Turkish-Dutch 
young adults a sense of security within their own group, resulting in less 
sensitivity to the judgements of the outgroup. This may contribute to 
a positive self-image and a sense of belonging that can mitigate feelings 
of social exclusion, being treated disrespectfully, and the perception of 
discrimination.  
Thirdly, radicalisation may be counteracted by the largely positive 
perception that Turkish-Dutch young adults have of their own social 
position and the opportunities they see for the upward social mobility 
that they attach so much importance to, partly because of their up-
bringing. This emphasis on social mobility combined with experiences 
of relative success are likely to dissuade young people who have been 
trying – sometimes for years – to succeed in Dutch society, from be-
haviour and attitudes that are incompatible with their ambitions. Even 
the respondents who expressed an affinity with organisations that have 
been characterised in the past as radical are not necessarily on a path to 
radicalisation, extreme or otherwise. This is particularly evident in the 
case of the politically active Kurdish young adults whose involvement 
with the PKK had more of a social function: it was a mark of identity 
rather than a deed that could be interpreted as an act of radicalism or 
extremism. Furthermore, given their experiences, these young people 
were never activist enough to engage in radicalism. 
In our conversations with Turkish-Dutch youngsters about their ambi-
tions, we did not encounter many high-flown – let alone extreme – ideas 
or ideals but, rather, broadly shared and generally laudable goals such 
as a decent level of education, a responsible and well-paid job, a partner 
and/or children. The ambitions of Turkish-Dutch young adults appear 
to be quite similar to those of their indigenous counterparts, with the 
proviso that a sizable number of Turkish-Dutch young adults also want 
to be good Muslims. They combine these different efforts in a pragmatic 
fashion by aligning their religious ideals with more mundane goals such 
as success in society. Viewed from this perspective, Turkish-Dutch young 
adults probably resemble their Dutch counterparts more than they or, 
for that matter, Dutch society seem to realise.
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Fijnaut, C. (2014). Criminology and the administration of criminal law 
[Criminologie en strafrechtsbedeling]. Antwerpen: Intersentia., 924 
pages, ISBN: 978-94-000-0466-5, € 79,90
Reviewed by Edwin Kruisbergen (WODC, Ministry of Security and Justice)
Cyrille Fijnaut has published a tremendous number of books, chapters 
and articles that cover an equally impressive range of topics. His work 
breathes knowledge of the English and Dutch as well as the Italian, 
German and French literature. Besides an international orientation, his 
work is characterized by a historicizing approach.
Without knowledge of its history, one cannot understand the 
development of criminology. According to Fijnaut, many contemporary 
introductions to criminology suffer from a lack of historical 
perspective. In order to fill this gap Fijnaut wrote Criminology 
and the administration of criminal law, a ‘historical transatlantic’ 
introduction to criminology. Starting in the 16th century, it describes 
the history of criminology – or rather the history of thought on crime 
and punishment – in Western Europe and the United States. Since 
the book’s scope is much broader than the focus of this newsletter, I 
have limited myself to the pieces on organized crime, some theoretical 
pieces, as well as the introductory and concluding chapters.
According to the author, changes in crime are one of the driving forces 
in the development of criminology. If the nature or extent of crime 
becomes a problem in the eye of the public, policymakers or interest 
groups, a need for criminological research will arise. Concerns about 
organized crime, for example, served as such an impetus for research.
The material on organized crime is part of a section on sociologically 
oriented criminology. After parts that deal with theories such as the 
differential association theory and the anomy theory, Fijnaut discusses 
the ‘sociology of organized crime’. This part is mainly based on the 
work of Thrasher and Landesco as well as on research instigated by the 
American Congress, e.g. the studies of Kefauver and McClellan.
Thrasher’s The gang (1927) brought organized crime to the attention 
of criminologists and jurists. In Chicago youth gangs and gangs that 
were at the heart of organized crime were strongly interrelated. So-
called Mastergangs had political connections, acted violently against 
adversaries, and organized their illegal activities efficiently as if they 
were running a regular business. In the same period, John Landesco 
conducted his Illinois crime survey. He mainly focused on the Torrio-
Capone syndicate in Chicago. Despite these studies and the size of 
the problem, there was little support in Congress for a firm federal 
approach. This did not change until the 1950s, when the American 
Senate launched a committee of inquiry, chaired by Kefauver. 
Kefauver’s worrying findings were confirmed by other studies, such as 
those of McClellan on organized crime involvement in labour unions.
Fijnaut dedicates a separate section to Sutherland’s White collar 
crime. According to Fijnaut, this famous work was nothing less than 
revolutionary. It redefined the core of criminology by asking the 
question: what is crime? Sutherland wrote about the corporate crimes 
committed by seventy of the largest companies in the United States. 
The hegemonic power of these companies allowed them to prevent 
being subjected to criminal investigation. It also prevented that their 
misdeeds became known to the general public or were labelled as 
criminal. Fijnaut notes that Sutherland unintendedly delivered proof 
for this hegemonic power. In fear of expensive legal procedures started 
by the white collar criminals described in his book, he deleted their 
names as well as some case studies.
In his final chapter Fijnaut concludes that since the 1980s criminology 
has become a ‘booming business’. The expansion of criminological 
research runs the risk of fragmentation. This is where the author again 
addresses organized crime. Fijnaut argues for discussion on the object 
of criminological research to prevent criminology from fragmenting 
into ‘a thousand single issues’ and ignoring the link between seemingly 
separate themes, such as the effect of organized crime on living 
conditions in cities, the relation between corruption and organized 
crime, and the link between terrorism and organized crime.
Recent	Publications	on	organized	crime	in	the	
netherlands	(selection):
The rest of the book does not really deal with organized crime as a 
separate subject (apart from banditism in earlier centuries). This is 
probably connected to the fact that the author only briefly discusses 
criminological research of the last decades, at least in comparison with 
his in-depth analysis of prior history. This might be because more 
recent research, concepts and theories and their interaction with society 
are simply of lesser importance. It might also be that it is harder to 
pinpoint the scientific, societal and historical meaning of more recent 
work, especially given its high level of differentiation. To find out, 
we would have to wait until another scholar dares to engage in the 
ambitious task of writing a history of criminology. However, that may 
take a while, since Fijnaut has set the bar very high. His Criminology 
and the administration of criminal law not only has an impressive 
historical, international, as well as substantive scope, it is also very well 
written. 
In my opinion – although I have only focused on specific parts of the 
book–  the reader will not be disappointed, especially readers who are 
not so much looking for a regular introduction to criminology, but 
would rather like to know more about the history of criminological 
thought and criminological thinkers.
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